Abstract: It has been claimed that in American Sign Language (ASL), the sign glossed as IX is used for a variety of functions, including personal pronouns, locatives, and determiners (Meier and Lillo-Martin 2013) . We propose to unify these disparate functions by analyzing IX as a demonstrative, appearing with or without an overt complement. Appealingly simple, this move accounts for a wide range of facts regarding the distribution and interpretation of IX. We focus on points to third-person referents. Such points are directed toward loci -real people, objects, or locations in the physical space around the signer, or places (possibly arbitrarily) associated with their referents in the signed discourse (Lillo-Martin and Klima 1990). The loci themselves raise considerable interesting issues (Barberà 2012, Gagne and Davidson 2014); however, their contribution is often conflated with the contribution of IX alone. Thus, we specifically ask: for a sign involving pointing, what is the nature of IX (i.e. the lexical item realized in a pointing hand-shape) when dissociated from the issue of locus (i.e. the space where it points to)?
Introduction
Having a pronoun -or an expression that is able to function as one -has become thought of as a primitive of linguistic theory. For instance, in syntax, pronominal expressions serve as diagnostic tools for the size of the c-command domain and ellipsis identification (e.g. Saito 2007, i.a.) ; in semantics, they are taken to diagnose operator-variable relations (see Heim & Kratzer 1998) ; in phonology, they are employed in the discussion of prosodic phrasing and stress (e.g. Selkirk 2005) ; in pragmatics, they are argued to reveal the 'accessibility hierarchy' (as in Ariel 1990 ). Many of these properties are necessarily contingent on the form of the pronoun under consideration. For example, more accessible antecedents have been argued to be picked out by pronouns that are less prominent in form (null ≫ weak ≫ full; Ariel 1990); personal pronouns have been argued to refer to subjects more readily than to objects, while demonstratives tend to refer to objects rather than subjects (Bosch 2006, i.a.) ; and in certain binding configurations (such as donkey-anaphora), personal pronouns are possible while demonstrative ones are not (Wiltschko 1998) . The characteristics just listed gloss over a number of important features of anaphoric expressions, yet they make a point: while pronouns may very well be expected to exist in a language (i.e. the burden of proof to the contrary lies with the alternative view), the form of such expressions matters.
In fact, accurate categorization of expressions of this sort may result in a simpler theory. Consider, for example, the following scenario: a researcher mislabels a lexical item 'X' as an item of type 'Y.' If an independent analysis of elements of type 'Y' exists, and the researcher attempts to reconcile her findings with this analysis, she may encounter various problems, precisely due to the fact that the element in question is not 'Y.' She then may propose a new account of 'Y,' whose sole purpose is to accommodate the findings. Accidentally, she may arrive at an improved analysis of 'Y'; however, this possibility is a fluke. The fact of the matter is that a mislabeling has occurred. Perhaps the previously advocated view of 'Y' su ces, even if it does not apply to 'X.' In fact, were the element in question labeled correctly as 'X,' the standard account of 'X'-type expressions would have predicted its distribution.
In this paper, we suggest that a mislabeling of this sort has occurred in the study of the so-called 'personal pronominal' ('Y' in the analogy above) expression in American Sign Language (ASL): much literature in sign linguistics refers to the relevant lexical item in these terms (see Sandler and Lillo-Martin 2006 and references therein) . Yet, we demonstrate that on a number of diagnostics, the element in question behaves as something other than what it is typically labeled. We further show that such behaviors do not require any special account but fall out rather nicely from the view that it is actually something else (i.e. our 'X'). Concretely, in ASL, the form commonly considered to be a personal pronoun is a point to some area of space, which we gloss IX (a.k.a. INDEX and PRO in Sign Language literature).¹ We describe this element in more detail in the next section. An (nearly) identical form is used for a number of other functions -IX has been described as a definite determiner and a locative adverbial as well as a personal pronoun (MacLaughlin 1997) . In much work on pronouns in ASL, authors explicitly state that they are not planning to subsume all instances of IX under the same analysis; rather, they address only a subset of the cases in which IX appears. What we will try to do here instead is open the possibility that a unified account can be o ered for all linguistic cases of IX. The essence of the claim is this: even when it seems to behave as such, ASL IX is not a personal pronoun per se (pace what is commonly claimed in the literature); rather, it is a demonstrative expression (Kaplan 1989, i.a.) . Such a view, it seems, allows us to capture various behaviors of IX that are ordinarily set aside by the alternative accounts.
Description
We begin this venture with the intuition that the form of the lexical item under examination here is not accidental -IX is identical to the co-speech pointing gesture employed in many spoken languages and frequently used along with a demonstrative to pick out a particular (typically present) referent in discourse. The photos in Figure 1 below illustrate the basic forms: pointing to the self (Figure 1a ; glossed here as 1IX) as a 1 st -person, pointing to the addressee (Figure 1b ; 2IX) as a 2 nd -person (though its status is controversial; see Meier 1990) , and pointing to other (Figures 1c and 1d ; 3IX) as a 3 rd -person forms. In the 'other' cases, the sign is directed either toward a referent physically present in the situation (Figure 1c) , or toward a location that is established as associated with a particular referent (Figure 1d) . Johnston (2013) , in his attempt to identify the 'purely pronominal points,' notes that "pointing signs in Auslan [Australian Sign Language] , and potentially other S[ign] L[anguage]s, may merely be more conventionalized or regularized forms of gestural pointing" (p. 152). To illustrate: we analyzed 80-minute natural language sample of 4 di erent Deaf adults addressing Deaf children (part of the CLESS corpus, Lillo-Martin and Chen Pichler 2008). We observed 361 instances of IX, used to pick out a variety of referents with the distribution given in Table 1 . In this data set, IX primarily refers to an individual either previously set up in the discourse or one that is explicitly present in some form (see Wulf et al. 2002 for a di erent type of corpus analysis).
However, for ASL at least, the gestural view of IX is di cult to maintain; its linguistic nature can be diagnosed in a number of ways. Here we set aside 1IX and 2IX and focus on signs directed at 3 rd -person referents (using the gloss IX as a general term). In our sample, 3 rd -person IX appears to fulfill various roles in the sentence, defined here rather coarsely as: subject, object, location, topic, modifier of a noun (phrase) and some other, as shown in Table 2 . When IX is used, its referent must be either physically present (as in Figure 1 (c) ) or previously established. If the referent has been assigned an area of space prior to uttering of IX, IX must be signed in the associated area. If the refer- ent has not been assigned such an area, IX may be signed in a neutral locationin front of the signer. The location used for a referent is often called a 'locus' (note that the locus is not a geometric point, but an region with some depth; cf. Liddell 2003) . The process of associating a referent with a locus is a complex issue to which we will return, although we will not attempt to fully explain it. In some cases, this process involves signing a name or NP in the location to be used; other cases involve signing a name or NP and then pointing to and/or gazing at a locus.² Once a locus has been associated with a referent, informally speaking, pointing to the locus is interpreted in much the same way as a pronoun. For example, in (1), 'Doreen' is associated with the locus labeled 'a'. Subsequently, a-IX (signed as in Figure 1 (c) or (d)) is interpreted as referring to Doreen.
(1) a-DOREEN a-IX TEACH ASL a-IX SKILLED 'Doreen i teaches ASL. She i is skilled.'
A related use of the 3 rd -person IX is that of 'deferred ostention' (Quine 1968; Recanati 1993) -a case when IX refers not to the item pointed at directly but to something related to the item which has been made salient, perhaps through context. For example, in (2), the point to the phone is interpreted as referring to the person on the other end of the line (the doctor).
(2 In (6a), IX is coindexed with PETER; in (6b) it appears bound by the quantifier ALL; in (6c), it allows for a sloppy reading (ii.), typical of bound pronouns; in (6d), IX cannot be bound within one clause and SELF is needed instead.
To briefly summarize then, IX in ASL is a linguistic expression that exhibits properties of both linguistic and discourse anaphora. In this, it behaves very much pronominally (cf. Johnson 2009) . But this, of course, does not mean that in its form it is necessarily a personal pronoun. What we would like to suggest here is that in fact, it isn't. To make our point more explicit, we will be arguing that ASL IX is better analyzed along the lines of the English demonstratives this/that.³ Why might we want to engage in this enterprise? There are a few reasons, which we will briefly mention here; in Section 4 we will explore this possibility in more detail and provide evidence to support it.
Puzzle
Recent research has uncovered some properties of IX that are not typical of personal pronouns. Schlenker (2013) has observed that unlike pronouns in English, IX can be used to pick out complement-set reference, even with non-downward entailing quantifiers (cf. Nouwen 2003) , as illustrated in (7). This is unexpected on the personal pronominal view of IX.
(7) 1-POSS STUDENT IXarc-ab MOST IXarc-a a-CAME. IXarc-b b-STAY HOME 'Most of my students came. They [= the ones who didn't come] stayed home.' (Schlenker 2013: 1) In both ASL and the English translation of (7), the same lexical item is used for both groups of students -the ones that came and the ones who did not. In English, use of the same pronominal expression to denote both sets is impossible. However, the utterance in ASL is quite natural. Further, Abner and Graf (2012) These oddities in behavior -atypical of pronouns -create a justification for considering an alternative. Of course, what would need to be accounted for are cases in which IX resembles a personal pronoun. We will be arguing here that such resemblance is just that -a resemblance, and the ability of IX to participate in processes characteristic of personal pronouns is only apparent. Instead, we suggest that upon closer examination, IX behaves as a demonstrative. The idea that pronouns are related to demonstratives is not entirely odd. In Eastern Armenian, for instance, demonstratives na, sa, and da are used in lieu of personal pronouns (Kozintseva 1995) . The same can be said for the Basque hau', hori, and hura (Saltarelli et al. 1988) as well as the Korean ku. While it is not the goal of this paper to argue for a particular theory of the aforementioned elements as well as their counterparts in other world languages, a brief survey of languages represented in WALS shows that out of the 225 languages examined, in 125, demonstratives and 3 rd person pronouns are morphologically related if not identical, as detailed in Table 3 .
However, simply finding that a relationship between demonstrative and personal pronouns is a 'regular occurrence' is not enough here. The proposal that IX in ASL is a demonstrative has non-trivial consequences. If our proposal is in line with the cross-linguistic data, certain behaviors of IX are necessarily expectednamely the behaviors one observes with demonstrative expressions in natural languages. Let us see what this means, beginning with complex demonstratives (those with an NP complement) and extending the discussion to their simplex (a.k.a. bare) counterparts. 
Proposal: Demonstrative
Demonstratives have puzzled semanticists for quite some time. A number of researchers have argued for a generalized quantifier analysis. Consider (9).
(9) a. That student who scored 100 % is a genius.
b. Most avid skiers remember that first black diamond run they skied. We understand (9a) as a case where there is exactly one student who received 100 %, and the property of being a genius holds of that student. (9b) records a case of quantification into a demonstrative: there is no particular skier under discussion, but skiers and black diamond mountains covary. The same could be said for (9c): for every encounter x, a di erent linguist talks to the speaker. In each of the sentences in (9), that can be easily replaced with the without any visible e ect on interpretation. Yet, this is not always so: for all their quantificational behavior, demonstratives often behave like rigidly referring expressions. For instance, consider Nowak's (2013) scenario involving a consistently rigged race such that the person wearing a particular color (say, red) is necessarily the winner because that is who the judges have been bribed to award the win to. In such a context, demonstratives disallow the covarying interpretation while [the NP] allows it (i.e. whoever wears the red shirt always wins):
(10) a. That guy in the red shirt always wins = referential/ * quantificational b. The guy in the red shirt always wins = referential/quantificational (Nowak 2013) The reason for this di erence remains somewhat unclear, and at least some of the literature capitalizes on the fact that such rigidly referring cases are typically understood as involving a demonstration. (11) (Wolter 2006: 196) Roberts (2003), following the original intuitions in Kaplan (1989) , o ers an account of this demonstration, articulated informally below. Demonstratives also exhibit another characteristic: they seem to generally prefer di erent discourse antecedents than other definite descriptions do (see Bosch   4 Formally: Given a context of evaluation C, with common ground CG s.t DomCG ⊆ DomC, and discourse referent S s.t.
where Desc(w)(g(i)) is true i the individual assigned to i by g has the property denoted by Desc in world w; and
is true i the individual assigned to j by g is in the set of entities (non-)proximal to the speaker g(S) and is the demonstratum intended by g(S) for the demonstration g(δ). (Roberts 2003: 118) et al. 2007 and references therein). This is illustrated in (13), where the demonstratives cannot be interpreted as picking out the subject of the previous sentence.
(13) a. Paul i wanted to go running with Peter j . But {the guy i,j /he i,j /that guy j, * i } had a cold. b. The patient i was examined by the doctor j . {The guy i,j /he i,j /that guy j, * i } was prepared.
This property of demonstratives has been described in various ways: as 'nonsubject orientation' (cf. Bosch 2006, i.a.) , as referring to the 'anti-aboutness topic' (Hinterwimmer 2014) , or to a 'non-default situation' (Wolter 2006) , among others. Whatever the final account, decades of formal examination have now yielded a fairly clear empirical picture: among definite descriptions, demonstrative expressions are special. In some contexts they are interchangeable with personal pronouns and overt noun phrases headed by the definite article (as in (15a)). In other contexts demonstrative expressions pattern on par with either pronouns (as in (14a), (15b), and (17)) or with overt [the NP] (as in (14b) and (16b) (also known as 'complex' vs. 'bare' or 'simplex' demonstratives) on our. The literature o ers no shortage of discussions related to the contribution of the definite article. Much of the field, following Frege (1893) , assumes that a definite description headed by a definite article expresses a proposition which is either unique (Russell 1905, i.a.) or familiar (Heim 1982, i.a.;  for an extended discussion of the two views, see Elbourne 2005) . For the purposes of this discussion, we assume the Fregean view of the expression the P: the uniqueness condition is a presupposition. For instance, the expression the Kind of France is bald receives the interpretation as in (20a). We also assume, with Wolter (2006) , for example, that a definite description is interpreted relative to a situation which may be default or not (although nothing here is contingent on this particular view; it simply allows a convenient demonstration of the facts). (20) individual which is A in s n and asserts that the unique individual which is A is also B in s n . c. s n = 'default' situation (discourse context) d. Given a sentence S, a situation variable s is a default situation just in case it is bound in S. Otherwise s n is a non-default situation. e. A default situation is a situation relative to which the main predicate of a clause is interpreted and the truth value of the clause is calculated. (Wolter 2006: 64) The expectation then is that if some lexical item is best described as a definite article, it ought to behave in the manner described in (20). MacLaughlin (1997) argues that IX as in (21) -specifically, 'prenominal IX' -encodes definiteness in ASL and is best described as a definite article. However, as has been argued elsewhere (Koulidobrova 2012, submitted) , prenominal IX fails various tests for being a definite article, behaving, instead, as a di erent type of element. Let us illustrate. The semantics in (20a) predicts the (and, by the temporary hypothesis, IX) to occur in so-called 'global uniqueness' cases. We see this in English in (16a): the universe is expected to have only one center; yet, the precedes the NP. Notice that a demonstrative in this environment is impossible; intuitively, it requires a larger set from which the relevant individual must be picked out.
As the universe has only one center, so does France have only one capital and, in a typical scenario, a church only one priest. Yet as (20) But perhaps the problem of * IX in (22) is that IX must be anaphoric/familiar, and (22) provides no room for such an anaphoric element. This move, coincidentally, is consistent with argumentation in Schwarz (2009) , who points out that the typical analyses of the semantics of the definite article (with English as the language of examination) is not fine-grained enough. In fact, it is best to distinguish between its weak uses (encoding uniqueness and part-whole relations) and strong uses (encoding familiarity and anaphoricity). The weak environment we have already examined (cf. (22)) and discovered that the ASL IX does not behave the way a definite article is expected to in such cases. It is still necessary to review the behavior of IX in strong environments. It turns out, however, that this path leads to a dead-end as well: the anaphoric/familiar PRIEST in (23) cannot be preceded by IX either. Compare then the use of IX in ASL with the in the translation sentences in English. In both cases necessarily involving the definite article in English (i.e. (22) and (23)), IX is impossible, and PRIEST remains obligatorily bare. In other words, whatever the definite article encodes -uniqueness or familiarity (see Schwarz 2009 for an extensive overview of the discussion) -IX appears unable to do. We thus conclude that the presence of IX next to the NP (or in lieu of it) signals something else. Taking a step back, let us now consider the alternative: what does it mean when we say that IX is not a definite article? Assuming that a definite article necessarily requires a 'default' situation as in (20), the prediction arises that in contexts that are distinct from such situations (i.e. 'non-default', e.g. where potential alter-natives must necessarily be considered), a definite article will be impossible but IX might be allowed. The prediction is borne out for [the NP] cases below; this is true for environments consistent with weak as well as strong definite articles. (26a)). Yet, as soon as the discourse offers a contrastive interpretation, the paradigm changes and the demonstrative becomes a preferred choice (as in (26b)).
(26) a. A car drove by. { OK The/ * that} horn was honking loudly. b. The girls received individualized reading lists with sections labeled 'on reserve' and 'in bookstore.' Every girl went to the reserve section of the library and read { * the/ OK those} books first. (Wolter 2006: 76, 100) To summarize then: in all of the cases where a definite article is licit and a demonstrative is not, [IX NP] is impossible, and, conversely, in the environments clearly calling for a demonstrative, [IX NP] is fine. In light of the data above, we are well justified in arguing that IX is not a definite article (see more discussion on the matter in Koulidobrova, submitted) . This is why in the global uniqueness cases, IX is quite odd, as shown earlier in (20). Let us consider further the nature of restrictions on demonstratives by returning to (16a), repeated here as (27).
(27) * That center of the universe is moving.
= (16a)
The demonstrative expression in (27) has an odd reading that there is more than one center of the universe, which of course defies common knowledge. Let us assume, however, that a two-centered universe is possible. This improves (27) dramatically, though only if deixis is involved -it is only possible if the immediate physical surroundings o er a chance at such a demonstration, much as in (14a), repeated here as (28).
(28) [pointing at a man] {That man/ * the man/he} looks friendly. = (14)
However, we now appear to be comparing one of the centers to another, appealing to a contrast of sorts -a reading that [the NP] ordinarily does not invoke. This observation is further exemplified in (29). The same test can be applied to (26) and (27), and the judgments reverse. We thus arrive at the view that IX diagnoses as something other than a definite article (either weak or strong) and is licit precisely in the cases one might ordinarily encounter a demonstrative instead.
. Is IX without an NP a pronoun?
So much for the view that IX may (sometimes) be analyzed as a definite article. However, what of the idea that it is sometimes a personal pronoun -the starting point of this discussion? Let us begin with an empirical observation arising from the data documented in the previous section. It turns out that in cases diagnosing for weak and strong articles (as in (22) and (23), IX alone is also impossible. Note that a (personal) pronoun -a bona fide anaphoric expression -should easily be able to refer to the church in (32a, b) and the priest in (32b) as is seen in the English translations. ASL and English behave in an opposite manner here, corroborating the view that IX does not pattern as a personal pronoun: a personal pronoun (such as it) should have been able to refer to the church -the NP immediately above IX. However, reference to the church is unavailable in (32a). In (32b), another NP enters -PRIEST. Nothing precludes IX from referring to either of the NPs; yet, this remains impossible.
It seems reasonable, then, to turn to the alternative -demonstrative expressions. The di erence between demonstrative expressions and other definite descriptions is typically argued to be presuppositional in nature: personal pronouns and demonstratives are essentially definite articles but with an additional piece that di erentiates between them. As we mentioned earlier, Roberts (2003) casts the presupposition in terms of the presence/absence of the demonstratum. Others approach the di erence between the relevant lexical items in terms of distanceboth intuitively and formally (cf. Wolter 2006 , Elbourne 2008 , reliance on the proximal/distal distinction (in terms of space and time) may after all account for the behaviors of demonstratives. The goal of this paper is not to side with any particular account. Instead, we aim to demonstrate that the distribution of IX simply follows the distribution of demonstratives. To that end then, we expect the aforementioned characteristics of demonstratives to surface with IX.
On an account of personal pronouns similar in spirit to that in (19) and, by extension, (20), a personal pronoun will pick out a maximally salient referent 'uniquely relative to the situation corresponding to the discourse context' -the 'default situation' (Wolter 2006 ). This intuition is confirmed in Bosch and Umbach (2006) -in German, P(ersonal)-pronouns (such as er below) tend to pick out subjects/discourse-old antecedents -those that are maximally salient from discourse and require no additional descriptive content. In contrast, D(emonstrative)-pronouns (i.e. der in (33)) (Bosch et al. 2003: 2) English complex demonstratives follow this pattern neatly, as shown in (17), repeated here as (34).
(34) a. A bishop i met another bishop j on a dusty road. = (17) {That bishop j, * i /the bishop i,j /he i, * j } sneezed.
How the reference to the discourse-old information is formalized remains a matter of some controversy. Hinterwimmer (2014) , for instance, argues that demonstrative pronouns disallow reference to the aboutness topic (Reinhart 1981) . Whatever the eventual solution, let us now summarize the descriptive generalization emerging from the relevant empirical observations and previous accounts: a personal pronoun (exemplified by the P-series in German) is a uniquely referring expression, typically interpreted relative to some standard/default situation and picking out a salient antecedent which also happens to be what the sentence is about. The question here is this: is it the case that ASL IX qualifies as such an element?
While a focused examination of the paradigm must await further study, the preliminary answer to this question seems to be 'no'. For example, in (35a), we take 'mother' to be the topic/subject/discourse-provided individual. Here, IX most naturally refers to either Mary or the sandwich. On the other hand, when SAND-WICH is topicalized as in (35b), IX most naturally refers to either the mother or Mary.
'My mother persuaded Mary to make a sandwich. IX is good.'
'Mother is persuading Mary to make a sandwich. IX is good'
Confirmation of the observation in (35) with more signers is needed (something that seems to be clearly required, judging by the experimental results in German, Bosch 2013), but this preliminary datum points away from the personal pronoun view of IX.
Recall also that unlike personal pronouns, demonstratives presuppose a demonstration (and a demonstratum), which, on all accounts, is at the heart of deixis. It seems that if IX were a personal pronoun semantically, or at least were able to function as one, it should have happily been able to coindex with a topic/subject NP up the tree and do so without any such demonstration. Yet, recall also that this is impossible in ASL. However, if the signer is pointing at some specific object, which is physically present in the environment and is assigned a locus, the use of IX in becomes felicitous. In (36), this object is the church. And while a personal pronoun happily picks out the linguistic object (church), it cannot refer to a part of the physical entity associated with this object (a rosewindow) or the general area in physical space. A demonstrative supported by deixis, on the other hand, can (as indicated in the English translation). Notably, IX in (36) can refer to either a part of or the whole church (e.g. the rose-window or the building itself), or even the general area in which the church is located. (36) In other words, IX in (36) refers not to the linguistic object but to the entity itself (Roberts 2003) .⁶ Incidentally, as Table 1 in Section 2 shows, in the child directed data set we analyzed, the majority of the instantiations of IX refer to individuals (human and non-human) immediately present in the physical context or cases of deferred ostension -i.e. the demonstratum. Yet, the most important observation regarding the (non-)pronominal status of IX is the following. Recall that the original (6), repeated here as (37), showed that IX appears to be bound -i.e. it serves as a variable, which strengthens the original motivation for its account as a pronoun. In these environments, a personal (and not a demonstrative) pronoun is expected: the IX refers to the subject/discourse/ aboutness topic. However, note that in (37), the locus of IX (namely 'a') corresponds to the previously established locus of the NP (or the QP) with which the IX is coindexed. Loci themselves raise considerable interesting issues (Barberà 2012 , Gagne & Davidson 2014 , Schlenker et al. 2013 , yet their contribution often is but should not be conflated with the contribution of IX. For instance, extraction out of an island is possible only if the locus has not been previously assigned (Koulidobrova 2012) .
6 Perhaps this is precisely the reason backwards anaphora is not considered fully grammatical in ASL (Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006) : for a deictic element to be felicitous, the demonstratum first needs to be introduced (and the demonstration occur).
So, in order to bypass the potential issues associated with previous establishment of loci, we examine cases without it by removing the locus for the NP anteceding the IX in (37). Not surprisingly, in light of other arguments in this paper, it turns out that the paradigm in (37) changes dramatically, as shown in (39). Thus, the altered sentences remain grammatical but the readings they induce have changed. Much like (37), (39) records utterances compatible with Condition B -a personal pronoun ought to be allowed here. However, now IX can no longer refer to any of the previously uttered NPs; it is necessarily disjoint in reference from them. Nor, as the data in (39) demonstrate, can the issue be reduced to some type of requirement on locus matching.⁷ If this were true, we would expect the following: the paradigm in (39) would once again become grammatical with IX uttered in the neutral space (lack of locus) -in front of the body of the signer. It turns out, however, that this move does not help: irrespective of whether IX in such a case is uttered at a particular locus (arbitrarily assigned to the right or to the left of the signer) or in a neutral space, reference to the NP (or QP) above is impossible. We take the behavior of neu-IX in such cases to reflect the nature of this element as di erent from a personal pronoun, and the di erent behavior of IX with a locus as something attributable to the contribution of the locus. The di erences in the referring possibilities of IX also arise in so-called 'donkey' anaphora in which farmers and donkeys co-vary, as in (40).
(40) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
Such E-type binding is allowed only when the locus has been previously assigned. Consider (41). In (41a), previous establishment of a locus for ONE STUDENT permits apparent binding of a-IX (and the co-referential interpretation is required).
On the other hand, when no locus is established, as in (41b), the bound reading is unavailable, irrespective of whether IX points to a specific locus or to a neutral location.
(41) a. WHEN ONE a-CL STUDENT i COME PARTY, a-IX i, * k HAVE-FUN.
'When a student comes to the party, he has fun.' b. WHEN ONE STUDENT i COME PARTY, a-
'When a student comes to the party, he has fun.' (Schlenker 2011: 18) The non-binding behavior of the 'pronominal' IX in (39, 41b) bears an uncanny resemblance to the demonstrative pronouns in German. For instance, Wiltschko (1998) notes that D-pronouns cannot be interpreted as bound variables:
(42) a. Peter i hat geglaubt, daß er i / * der i dumm ist 'Peter believed that he/DEM is stupid.' b. Jeder Mann i glaubt, daß er i / * der i dumm ist 'Every man believed that he/DEM is stupid. ' (Wiltschko 1998: 144) Why this might be remains open to discussion; both semantic and syntactic accounts have been proposed (see, e.g., Hinterwimmer 2014 vs. Patel-Grosz and Grosz, t.v., i.a.) . The account advocated by Wiltschko is that a D-pronoun is a definite description; as such, it is subject to Condition C. The very same explanation is available for the ASL IX: on the view that IX is a pronoun, the di erence between (37) and (39) is not immediately clear; on the approach to IX as a demonstrative, (40) is excluded as a condition C violation, similarly to (42) and (43b).
(43) a. Jill i thinks that she i is nice. b. Jill i thinks that {this/the} person * i is nice.
We have now arrived, we think, at a second conclusion: as IX preceding an NP can hardly be considered a definite article, neither can IX occurring alone be viewed as a personal pronoun. Without the previous establishment of a locus, it cannot be bound; instead, it tends to have a deictic use -i.e. it is picking out some physical object in the environment. At the same time, data suggest that IX tends to pick out antecedents that are 'non-default' -when the NP it refers to is not a subject/topic and could be contrasted with another NP. Everything works out nicely if, with and without an accompanying NP, IX is a demonstrative. Such an approach to IX explains some otherwise puzzling ob-servations about ASL 'pronouns' previously employed as evidence for modalityrelated di erences between sign and spoken languages: as discussed in Section 3, the possibility of reference to the complement set (Schlenker 2013 , (7)), and the lack of syntactic (but, rather, discourse only) binding with IX (Abner and Graf 2012, see (8) ); and as discussed below, lack of a consistent formational distinction between 'pronominal' and 'locative' pronouns (Johnston 2013) . These characteristics fall out naturally from the view that interpretation of demonstratives recruits discourse binding, as has been argued for cases like (44) King (2001) or Elbourne (2005) in approaching this elided/null material as contributing the property of 'being a thing' (King 2001: 141-143) , an 'individual of type ⟨e⟩' (Elbourne 2005) .⁸
The unexpressed 'individual' could be a person or a place. The ultimately locative (in terms of distance and time) nature of demonstratives now allows for an approach to the 'adverbial' (MacLaughlin 1997) postnominal IX in the original version of the example amended in (21), repeated in full here as (45), to be subsumed under the same analysis. This second IX, which may be translated as here/ there, is comparable to "this/that place," with the phonologically null place. ⁹ The formalism remains to be worked out, but the path to capturing the various uses of IX has now been cleared.
Loose ends
We have thus far challenged two views regarding IX -showing that IX behaves as neither a definite article nor a pronoun. We have also argued that it is best approached as a demonstrative. This of course presents its own challenges: we now turn to the question whether the di erent types of demonstrative expressions (with and without an overt NP) can be unified. Some researchers have argued that 'bare'/'simplex' demonstrative di er from 'complex' ones minimally: in the 'bare' cases, the NP is simply elided (King 2001 , Elbourne 2008 . An account of this sort would have di culty explaining why unlike the complex demonstratives, bare demonstratives seem to resist bound variable interpretation: (47) In (47a), the complex demonstrative refers to the child's hand; in (47b), the simplex version thereof refers to the event involving hand-slapping and -cruciallynot the hand itself. On the view that that in (47b) is [that NP], and ellipsis is either the usual matter of identity (as in King 2001) or an abstract noun ONE (as in Elbourne 2005) , it is unclear where the interpretation in (47b) comes from. To elaborate: the NP-ellipsis account predicts several possibilities for the interpretation of the elliptical structure: that that refers either to the child or the hand that has been slapped (both of which are NPs in the discourse). Yet, neither of these readings is available: the only reading of that in (47b) is the event of self-hand-slapping administered by a child. Incidentally, if that in (47b) were to be substituted by it, the set of available readings would include both the hand and the event of hand-slapping.¹⁰ King (2001) suggests that the deleted NP node might not host any lexical material at all and, rather, contributes the property of 'being a thing' (King 2001: 141-143) . However, even with this amendment, it remains unclear why the reference to the event is possible here, and no other reference is available. Similarly, Elbourne (2005) argues that the argument of that in the bare demonstrative cases is a phonologically null noun ONE -an individual of type ⟨e⟩. On this view as well, reference to the baby or to the child in (47b) is not excluded. But we set this issue aside for now, unable to o er any evidence from ASL to help solve the problem -as we had noted earlier, without previous introduction of a locus, IX resists binding: when it is uttered, with or without an NP, it has a strong referential flavor and, thus, the asymmetry between a complex and a simplex demonstrative is bleached out.
Similarly, if the complement of the IX is something like Elbourne's ONE (or King's 'thing') -which, for our purposes we informally label INDIVIDUAL -it is somewhat unclear why it appears not to be possible for either that or IX to be bound by a negative quantifier. (48) (48b) is exactly what goes wrong in (48a) as well as (47b) -while the reasons for this remain to be explored, the resistance of the simplex demonstrative to being bound by a (negative) quantifier is not a novel observation. Another question concerns the NP ellipsis itself. As has been argued elsewhere (Koulidobrova 2012) , NP ellipsis as in (49a) is productive in ASL. However, it is unable to strand a quantifier in the manner we see in English, as shown in (49b).
10 Note also that in a few dialects of English in which it is generally used to refer to a baby (Received Pronunciation, e.g.), the pronoun in (47) can also refer to the baby. This suggests that some feature-matching/-agreement is involved -in the original (47) 'it' is able to refer to the hand (ineligible for a feminine or a masculine pronoun in English). Here we might assume a presuppositional approach to such feature matching (Schlenker 2003) ; however, what is unclear now is what to do with the reference to the event. At any rate, the point here is that the options a orded by the personal pronoun are di erent from those available with the demonstrative. One option here is to bite the bullet and admit that the ellipsis of the NP argument of the demonstrative, thereby yielding a simplex demonstrative, is of a di erent variety than the other NP-ellipsis attested in a number of languages. This path may explain why, for instance, (48a) improves only if the original NP -and not our INDIVIDUAL -is restated.
(51) There is no kid here that thinks that [that kid] is stupid This, however, will be a di cult path to take. For one, we have shown elsewhere that nouns in ASL appear to be able to type-shift between kinds and individuals (as in Chierchia 1998; see discussion in Koulidobrova 2012); this predicts the ellipsis of the sort discussed in Elbourne -one that results in a phonologically null element of type ⟨e⟩ or ⟨e,t⟩ -to be just the type of ellipsis that we observe in (49) and (50). The other option to pursue is that the argument of the demonstrative is not phonologically null but, rather, unsaturated. If this is the case, then we expect cases of simplex demonstratives to be allowed while NP ellipsis stranding the complex demonstrative is impossible. This is precisely what the data demonstrate: in 'regular' use of IX, the element is licit irrespective of the overt presence of a supporting NP; in clear ellipsis configurations involving stranding of IX, it is disallowed.
Conclusion
Let us now take stock. Echoing the suggestions in McBurney (2002) , who notes that "the class of signs traditionally referred to as personal pronouns may, in fact, be demonstratives" (McBurney 2002: 365) , we have o ered explicit evidence against the accounts of IX in ASL that analyze it as both a personal pronoun and a definite determiner, and have shown that the lexical item under examination is best viewed as a demonstrative. We have steered clear from engaging in the debate in the literature regarding the semantics of demonstratives; instead, we have focused on the empirical observations, having adopted an account of the facts that most clearly illustrates our point. A number of interesting conclusions have surfaced during our examination of IX. One is that on any account which equates a personal pronoun with an article, IX cannot be a personal pronoun. This is simply because IX cannot serve as a definite article. In fact, in all the cases requiring a definite article and not a demonstrative, IX is illicit (and no other lexical item will do) -driving us to the conclusion that ASL is a language without an overt definite article. Elsewhere (Koulidobrova 2012) we show that this is a plausible observation: on a number of unrelated diagnostics, ASL behaves on par with languages without overt definite articles.
Of course, simply because the language does not have an overt morpheme for the definite article does not mean that it should have no overt personal pronounthe claim in the literature equating the two is being made about the semantics of the lexical items, not necessarily their overt realization. Therefore, independent evidence was required to defend our point of view. In our examination of the 'pronominal' use of IX we discovered that it appears to parallel with German Dpronouns -the ones that tend to pick out the types of referents other demonstrative expressions do.¹¹ Furthermore, if our view of IX is on the right track, the data we presented challenge the approach to the covert nominal argument of demonstratives as a case of NP ellipsis. More examination is in order here.
Admittedly, much remains to be worked out, and many issues remain undiscussed. For instance, we have not provided any explanation for why exactly previous introduction of loci changes the paradigm. The question also arises whether the analysis advocated here could incorporate other claims in the literature regarding pointing and pronominals in ASL. We have also avoided discussing whether any relationship should be established between the third person IX (our a-IX) and its 1 st -and (possibly) 2 nd -person counterparts (1IX and 2IX respectively). This question is not trivial: previous research has argued that there is no grammatical 2 nd person form (i.e., the relevant grammatical distinction is first vs. non-first; Meier 1990, Meier and Lillo-Martin 2013) ; and the 1 st person form behaves logophorically in attitude reports (Lillo-Martin 1995 , Schlenker 2014 . Additionally, we would like to express caution against making our claim universal for sign languages. It is possible that cross-linguistic di erences will be observed here, especially among languages unrelated to one another. Finally, the data reported here should be further compared with other languages (spoken and signed) from Table 3 -languages in which demonstratives exist but personal pronouns do not. More research is in order.
